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It would not be entirely unfair to observe with respect to François Laruelle—
whose (non-)philosophy has experienced, in the past decade, a rather dramatic 
upsurge in attention outside of France—that the order in which his books have 
gradually been translated into English has not done any great favours to his recep-
tion. Laruelle published his first monograph in 1971, and by the time that the first 
English-language translations of his major works began to appear (viz. 2010’s Phi-
losophies of Difference [1986] and Future Christ [2002]), he had already published 
22 such books, on top of sundry other articles and chapters, in French. Although 
the 2013 release of Philosophy and Non-Philosophy [1989] and Principles of Non-
Philosophy [1996] arguably furnished Anglophone readers with the most central, 
programmatic works authored by Laruelle, this did little to address the overall 
deprivation of his oeuvre’s proper continuity, the haphazardness of translation—
in spite of all good intentions—liable to give the impression that his books could 
effectively be read at random. 
After all, Laruelle’s body of work evinces a patently linear progression and devel-
opment of ideas: he is very much a systematic thinker, with said system expanded 
upon in each of his books, almost all of which presume knowledge of his previous 
works and the concepts that he has deployed within them. It is genuinely a corpus, 
a body of work that is progressively constructed, rather than a series of interre-
lated but largely independent texts (as is perhaps the predominant model within 
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continental philosophy). And it is for this reason that I would contend that the 
sequence of his English-language translation has been inimical to his reception: 
readers have been forced to dive right into the depths of his corpus, rather than 
being able to start in the shallows and gingerly wade in further. This has led to 
quite understandable confusions: for example, there is little indication supplied 
in the immensely difficult (albeit rewarding) Philosophies of Difference that the cen-
tral concept of the One, which remains frustratingly indistinct in that particular 
text, was actually explicated quite clearly only one book prior: in A Biography of 
Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities [1985].1
Indeed, although A Biography of Ordinary Man is still quite an embryonic piece of 
writing, missing many of the characteristic elements of what he would later come 
to label “non-philosophy,” I would nonetheless regard it (contentiously, maybe) 
as the single most important text for grasping both the provenance and develop-
ment of Laruelle’s broader project. For it is here that the fundamental problemat-
ic which traverses said project is first clearly elucidated, in an unusually straight-
forward and lucid manner: namely, the question of whether there is “a proper 
and primitive essence of man, one that would not be an attribute of something else” (8), 
striving to locate the real within a thought both of and from man qua individual.2 
Although Laruelle’s work is often presented, not wholly without justification, as a 
more radical or all-encompassing mutation of deconstruction, critiquing the self-
legitimizing circularity of philosophical reason, this is only one, negative, aspect 
of a much larger positive project. As we are frequently reminded in this particu-
lar text, Laruelle has no interest in the negation or overcoming of philosophical 
reason, advocating instead “a strong but tolerant indifference to philosophy” (1), 
which is in turn founded upon the identification of a transcendental modality of 
thought—namely that of the “individual”, the “minority”, or, as he comes to refer 
to them in this book, the “ordinary man”—that is utterly incompatible with, and 
prior to, all such reason.
The overarching purpose of this book, which is presented as a sequence of theo-
rems and explications, is to elaborate “the fundamental concepts of a rigorous—if 
not empirical, at least ‘scientific’—discipline of man, and, therefore, of minorities” 
(31), a discipline which is in no way philosophical, and which cannot be rendered 
convertible with the aporias of philosophical reason. Its premise is deceptively 
straightforward: man is not a façade or illusion, he is not a mere epiphenomenal 
product of difference, becoming, power relations, and so on; rather, man is abso-
lutely real, he exists as such, but he exists in this fashion outside of the World, re-
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lated to the latter only in a uni-lateral manner. This is the minoritarian experience 
of man. At the same time though, man is inevitably condemned to find himself 
within the World, to be forced into action, practice, and ultimately philosophy, 
all of which divides him from himself. This is, correspondingly, the authoritarian 
experience of man, whereby he is placed under the yoke of various universal at-
tributes and predicates—e.g. language, power, history, etc.—that come to define 
his worldly destiny. In opposition to the latter, Laruelle hopes to bring to light a 
thought of man in himself, a thought that is too “ordinary” (i.e. non-philosophi-
cal) for these Authorities, and for philosophy. Such a thought forms the basis of 
what he claims to be a rigorous science of man, which no longer takes the latter 
as its object (it is not simply an extension of the human sciences), and does not 
“borrow its means of investigation, demonstration, and validation from existing 
sciences” (4), but instead proceeds directly from man, and is in fact identical with 
man in his essence.
This new science, and the minority experience more generally that Laruelle wish-
es to highlight, is “based in a thought of the One rather than a thought of Being” 
(8): it does not look “beyond” man, toward a purported essence, hiding behind 
him, that would be defined in terms of Being, or the Other, or Difference, or any 
other mode of transcendence; it does not announce the death of man, or the over-
coming of man; it is not post-human, or anti-human, or trans-human, or even all 
too human; it instead looks to that which comes before all these philosophical and 
anthropological projections which objectify man, positing him as something other 
than himself. What this science seeks, in other words, is the immediate givenness 
of the One, a pre-philosophical immanent experience, without any possible tran-
scendence, that does not follow from the One, but is identical with the One. This 
experience, Laruelle boldly proclaims, is the veritas transcendentalis that so many 
philosophers have vainly sought: an “unreflective immanence, without alienation 
or nothingness, and thus without a self-position: non-thetic or non-position (of) 
itself” (60) that is the basis of all truly minoritarian knowledge. 
Western philosophy—what Laruelle frequently refers to as the “unitary” para-
digm of thought—has only been able to ever recognize the One as “as a mere 
Unity, transcendental, to be sure, but in the mixed, logico-real, manner of a unity 
that is added to the empirical or ideal manifold” (55), a representation, rather 
than a lived reality. It can only conceive of unity as formed by division (e.g. Being 
and Nothingness, Identity and Difference, etc.), entirely failing to grasp the One 
in its essence. Part of the novelty of Laruelle’s project, then, is to not treat the real 
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as an object of thought, not even as an impossible or aporetic object, but as the 
identity of thought as such, proceeding from the real immanence of this inalien-
ably finite experience of the One. This is a solitude of man, who is not enfolded 
within a totality or a unity, who is nothing other than finitude, irreducible to all 
external attributes or predicates. And it is the recognition of this radically finite, 
determinate reality of man, Laruelle argues, that allows us to “lay claim to a tran-
scendental naiveté, real but precisely not philosophical, at the foundations of the 
absolute science of man” (12), a naiveté that does not ignore philosophy as such, 
but remains wholly indifferent to it, rendering all philosophies ultimately contin-
gent. The biography of ordinary man, then, claims to be in effect a biography of 
us, of each individual: anterior to the philosophical universal of Man (and his vari-
ous permutations and deconstructions), we find the ordinary man, the ordinary 
woman, the ordinary individual or human.3
A Biography of Ordinary Man follows quite directly, in both its ends and means, 
from Laruelle’s previous (as yet untranslated) book The Minority Principle [Le 
principe de minorité], published four years prior, which marks the inauguration of 
his self-described “Philosophy II” period, seeing Laruelle veer sharply away from 
the largely Nietzschean and Deleuzoguattarian equation of multiplicity with dif-
ference and minoritarian thought with libidinal productivity that characterized 
his early works, wherein he sought to identify a latent machinic strain of philo-
sophical syntax that would remain resistant to all interpretive mastery. He in-
stead turns toward a thought of multiplicity (or more precisely, multiplicities), that 
is utterly incompatible with the continuous multiplicities typical of the contempo-
rary philosophies of difference, which he comes to view as mere distensions of the 
Western philosophical tradition, incapable of ever really altering its fundamental 
structure. In this preceding book, a rather curious and enigmatic text even by 
Laruelle’s own standards (whose writing style, although not as impenetrable as 
many would like to assert, is certainly idiosyncratic), he posits the titular minor-
ity principle as that which “compels us to seek out the possibility of multiplicities 
beyond Being, the Idea, the State, History, etc.”, identifying a concept of unary 
multiplicities, to which he grants the name minorities, that have been “forgotten” 
by philosophical discourse, and which can be thought prior to and independent 
of any and all universals, and thus in their very essence.4 His thesis, in short, is 
that “individuals are the ultimate constituents of reality, before Being, before the 
World, History, and the State.”5 It is in the figure of the One that we ultimately find 
the unreflective essence of such individuals. 
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The Minority Principle is, to a much greater extent than Laruelle’s later works, 
grounded in familiar philosophical principles (viz. the transcendental methods 
of Kant and Husserl). Wishing to finally rescue the transcendental method from 
the empirico-transcendental doublet6 that always ends up tracing the outlines 
of transcendental from empirical content, Laruelle seeks “the unknown real = X, 
which gives an absolute (and no longer relative or ideal) character to the tran-
scendental, and likewise the unknown transcendental = X which snatches the real 
from the play of being and Being, from the objectified real—each multiplying the 
power of the other beyond the powers of Being.”7 It is precisely here that A Biogra-
phy of Ordinary Man takes a different path, in two particular aspects: firstly, rather 
than departing from these philosophical materials toward a theory of the One or 
the minorities, it proceeds directly from the latter, making scant reference to ei-
ther historical or contemporary philosophy (even whilst borrowing terminology 
from both), distancing itself from all norms of philosophical disputation, includ-
ing any pretension to have surpassed or overcome preceding thinkers; secondly, 
in place of the prior book’s intimidatingly abstract and schematic conceptualiza-
tion of the minorities, Laruelle here gives these finite individuals a quite specific 
character—the real and the transcendental are no longer unknown, for they find 
their essence in the figure of the “ordinary man.”
Following a lengthy introduction, wherein Laruelle outlines both the need for a 
rigorous science of man, and the notion of the “ordinary” man from whom such 
a science proceeds, the book is composed of four chapters, which simultaneously 
correspond to the three principal definitions of the ordinary man, and proceed 
in line with the irreversible order of immediate givens that is at the basis of this 
science: the first two chapters introduce us to the finite individual, the “minor-
ity”, in their real essence, and the Authorities who seek to define such an indi-
vidual using their own universal concepts and categories, therefore never actually 
speaking of the essence of man, but only interpreting it in their own terms; the 
third chapter discusses the mystical existent, by which the finite individual deter-
mines the World and the Authorities in the last instance; and the fourth chapter 
finally describes the pragmatic existence, whereby the finite individual acts upon 
the World and the Authorities not only mystically, but pragmatically, legitimating 
them as objects of the real science of man. It is in these latter two chapters that 
we find “the two means man has for escaping from unitary—philosophical and 
linguistic—enchantment” (185), furnishing a non-philosophical thought of ordi-
nary man from and in his essence.
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The first two chapters—entitled “Who are Minorities?” and “Who are Authori-
ties?,” respectively—establish the distinction between stato-minoritarian indivi-
duals, who are thought in terms of difference, and minorities in themselves, who 
cannot be reduced to any differential determination, and are thus real as such, 
thought before any and all universal attributes. A science of ordinary man, Laru-
elle suggests, is as much as anything a political task, for it is through such a sci-
ence that we might learn “how not to inscribe minorities on the body of the State” 
(33), refusing to conceive of individuals in terms of those attributes projected 
upon them by the Authorities, and instead thinking them as real minorities who 
determine these Authorities in the last instance—a uni-lateral determination, ab-
sent of all reciprocal determination. “Ontology and politics, which serve us as 
thought,” he submits, “have never been able to conceive of individuals as anything 
other than modes of the State or of the great universals” (34). And yet, in the last 
instance it is not the State which defines individuals; rather, the State is defined 
by those finite individuals who are absolutely autonomous in relation to it. We 
are all minorities, individuals without individuality, singulars without singularity, 
multiples without multiplicity, unthinkable within the horizon of philosophical 
reason. The minoritarian experience is that of the ordinary man as an immediate 
given, as an unreflective transcendental experience of the One as immediately 
real in and from itself, without division or alterity.
In addition to this experience of the ordinary man as immediate given, in the 
radical finitude of his essence, however, “he also produces a second type of expe-
rience, that of universals: the World, History, Sexuality, Language, Power, Philoso-
phy, etc.” (76), those Authorities which come after the One, and which represent 
a philosophical and political resistance to the One. This secondary experience of 
man is one in which he is thrown into the World, but at the same time one in which 
he also unilateralizes this relation between himself and the World, yielding “an 
absolute, irreversible contingency prior to any decision—philosophical or other-
wise—that affects the insertion of minorities into Authorities, of individuals into 
the World” (80). Whereas the minorities find their essence in the real-as-One, a 
unity-without-scission, an immanence-without-transcendence, the essence of the 
Authorities lies instead in what Laruelle calls “effectivity”, a mixture of the One 
with its Other (viz. a particular part or mode of the World). Through the process 
of unilateralization, otherwise known as determination in the last instance, ordi-
nary individuals are able to effectuate the science proper to them, breaking any 
presumed continuity or relation between the One and its object, manifesting an 
impermeable distinction between the proper essence of the Authorities (effectiv-
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ity), and their transcendental or real essence (the immediate finite experience of 
the One), inasmuch as they are determined by the latter in the last instance.
Having thus defined the parameters of the minorities and Authorities, Laruelle 
then moves on in the latter two chapters—“Ordinary Mysticism” and “Ordinary 
Pragmatics”—to lay down the foundation for a real critique of the World, first in 
a theoretical, and then practical mode. Such a critique seeks neither to dissolve 
nor negate the World, but merely to shatter the latter’s ignorance of itself, its hal-
lucination of its own reality qua totality. The mystical is, for Laruelle, not at all a 
movement of transcendence, and is located neither above, nor beyond everyday 
existence; rather, the mystical is simply the real as such, the ordinary individual, 
who precedes all worldly existence. Ordinary mysticism, then, is the critical com-
ponent of the aforementioned absolute science, striving to put the World “back 
in its place” (137-138), positing it not as an illusion or deception, but as a positive, 
contingent reality that has no legitimate claim to the real as such. This mysticism 
is complemented by a practical critique consisting in a finite use of philosophy, 
starting from the finite acting subject, which extends “the concept of performa-
tivity beyond its linguistic and metaphysical limits” (181). This pragmatics is an 
extension of the mystical form of determination in the last instance, manifest-
ing as a specifically and solely human mode of causality acting upon the World, 
really autonomous in relation to the various authoritarian rules and procedures 
by which philosophy produces meaning. At the same time, however, it takes the 
World, and the universals furnished by the Authorities, entirely seriously: “prag-
matics is the generosity of the One or of ordinary mysticism recognizing the right 
of the World, recognizing in it a certain reality” (188), but a reality wholly distinct 
from that of the One, and the minorities.
This theme of the “ordinary” individual, who finds their real essence in an abso-
lute finitude or radical immanence, and who is able to act upon the World without 
having to define themselves along philosophical lines is maintained throughout 
Laruelle’s oeuvre, right through to his most recent texts. Although it comes to 
accumulate greater complexity, what remains stable is the notion that there is 
an experience of the One, an experience of ourselves, that is not programmed in 
advance by philosophical or authoritarian (i.e. worldly) teleologies, that is never 
subject to transcendence or division, that is not in becoming or traversed by mul-
tiplicity, but simply is, not as an object of knowledge, but as an experience of it-
self, in its own immanence. An ordinary pragmatics is a practice that “remains as 
passive as the real itself” (192). It does not attempt to intervene in the World, but 
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simply maintains a steady indifference to it, safe in the knowledge and experience 
of its own inalienability. 
Of course, a project so heavily centred upon an irreducible individuality, especial-
ly one that labels all social, political, and even worldly attributes as “authoritar-
ian,” may be unpalatable to many readers. In an age of increasing social atomiza-
tion, one might ask, what need do we have for “a biography of the solitary man” 
(8)? Likewise, one might quite reasonably baulk at the use of the gendered term 
“man,” which is not only likely to seem painfully outdated to Anglophone read-
ers, but would seem to project upon this figure certain historically and socially 
contingent attributes, contrary to Laruelle’s own claims.8 In this respect, it would 
seem crucial that we take seriously the priority which Laruelle purports to give 
to the “immediate actuality of use” over “all the linguistic or other projections 
in which unitary thinkers, that is, intellectuals, engage” (177): the term “man,” as 
used in this context, is certainly inadequate as a description of the real identity 
that underpins all experience, whether worldly or otherwise, but so is any other 
term—minority, individual, the One, etc. 
Ultimately, it would seem, whatever name we bestow upon this identity is of no 
real import, for such descriptions have no effect upon its unreflective essence. 
It is philosophy that identifies the human individual with such generalities—“a 
knowledge, an activity, a race, a desire, an existence, a writing, a society, a lan-
guage, a sex” (5)—and in doing so effaces their essence, dividing them from them-
selves. The specific term “man” is a signifier drawn from philosophical materi-
als, but it is here mutated, rendered inert or sterile, stripped of all propositional 
content, such that it does not in any way describe this individual, who is after all 
“without a face and without qualities” (10), but merely acts as the support for a 
minoritarian thought that proceeds irreversibly from them. There is no archetype 
or example, whether empirical or ideal, of what an ordinary “man” is, for “he” is 
nothing other than a lived experience, a finite and intrinsic immanence.
Likewise, the term “authoritarian,” in spite of its negative overtones, must sure-
ly be understood not as a value judgement (which would reinscribe it within a 
philosophical hierarchy), but as a neutral descriptor of the way in which the Au-
thorities, and the World in which they operate, function through a pretension to 
universality that robs individuals of their finitude, situating them within a total-
ity (they are “totalitarian,” in a very literal sense), denying them their status as 
minorities, rendering them in some way equivalent (even if this is an equivalence 
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grounded in difference). “When minorities meet historical, cultural, and political 
criteria,” Laruelle writes, “they are thereby responsible and disputable groups, 
countable and speakable in institutional spaces and according to supposedly giv-
en codes—groups that are more or less identifiable and that agree, whether they 
like it or not, to enter into the authoritarian parousia of the World” (70). The mi-
norities are, in their essence, invisible to the domain of politics, philosophy, and 
any other unitary mode of thought. In fact, Laruelle brazenly suggests, a rigorous 
science of these minorities, and thus of ordinary man, might actually become a 
“means of eradicating the resentment and hatred of the World innate to unitary 
or philosophical critique” (142-143), attesting to the real and absolute autonomy 
of the One in relation to the World of which it is the essence.
Laruelle’s goal is not to diminish, resist, or revolt against the World, society, cul-
ture, or whatever else in the name of the solitary man, but to display a positive 
indifference, rendering these formations (and their numerous predications) con-
tingent in relation to the only truly unalienated and inalienable knowledge. Such 
knowledge, which is an irreducibly human knowledge, is not something that we 
can find either outside of ourselves or even within ourselves; it is, rather, that 
which we find before ourselves—that is, before our worldly existence—not in a 
temporal, or even logical, but purely transcendental sense. The minorities “form 
the in-audible background noise of culture and history, a noise completely in the 
background, uncreated and thus inexhaustible” (67), the noise that philosophy 
has forgotten, and will always forget, but which nevertheless remains its real es-
sence in the last instance. Laruelle’s work does not strive to be “useful,” at least 
in the sense that we have come to expect from philosophers. He does not spruik 
concepts that might be “applied” to empirical objects, seeking to explain, judge, 
or even negate the latter. He does not entreat another philosophical intervention 
into the World, which would end up just another “an instrument of vengeance” 
wielded against the latter (142). It is, rather, the decidedly naive experience of 
one’s own minority, one’s own unbreakable finitude, one’s real and absolute au-
tonomy, in the face of any and all authoritarian and totalitarian gestures—a real 
reversal of the oft-derided Copernican Revolution, presuming “that the finite sub-
ject is located at the center (of) itself, and no longer of the World, and that the 
World ceases to revolve around the subject so that it can be determined in the 
last instance by it” (74)—which constitutes the implacable premise of Laruelle’s 
non-philosophical project.
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NOTES
1. The introduction to this book was previously published under the name “A Rigorous Science 
of Man,” in From Decision to Heresy: Experiments in Non-Standard Thought. Ed. and trans. Robin 
Mackay. Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012, pp. 33-73.
2. This and all subsequent parenthetical references are taken from François Laruelle, A Biography 
of Man: On Authorities and Minorities. Trans. Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet. Cambridge and Med-
ford, MA: Polity, 2018.
3. The relationship between Laruelle’s project and humanism is complex, considering the primacy 
he gives to the figure of man. A decade later, he would argue that humanism comprises a “set 
of philosophical images of man, rather than the rigorous knowledge of the latter […] a form of 
speculative imagery, the product of an imagination, probably transcendental, understood in a very 
general sense as an operation of synthesis of contraries,” which he counterposes against his own 
postulation of “a transcendental science as simple, uni-lateral, or non-specular reflection (of) the 
real.” More specifically, he suggests that “these new perspectives on man constitute, rather than 
an anti-humanism, a sort of ‘non-humanism,’ a science of man that is more universal than any 
philosophy” (Théorie des Étrangers: Science des hommes, démocratie, non-psychanalyse. Paris: Éditions 
Kimé, 1995, pp. 105, 110, my translation).
4. François Laruelle, Le principe de minorité. Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1981, 6, my translation.
5. Ibid.
6. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans. A.M. 
Sheridan Smith. London and New York: Routledge, 1970.
7. Laruelle, Le principe de minorité, 13.
8. Laruelle would later argue, as part of his proposal for a non-psychoanalysis, that a “unified theory 
of woman and man,” i.e. a non-unitary theory, “is possible on the condition that it is capable of 
declaring the theoretical and pragmatic invalidation of sexual difference, and its usage as a simple 
material in a science of humans” (Théorie des Étrangers, 317). Cf. François Laruelle and Anne-Fran-
çoise Schmid, “Sexed Identity.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 19:2 (2014): 35-39.
